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Animal Minds and Animal Emotions1
MARIAN STAMP DAWKINS
Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford, OX1 3PS UK

SYNOPSIS.
The possibility of conscious experiences of emotions in non-human
animals has been much less explored than that of conscious experiences associated
with carrying out complex cognitive tasks. However, no great cognitive powers are
needed to feel hunger or pain and it may be that the capacity to feel emotions is
widespread in the animal kingdom. Since plants can show surprisingly sophisticated ‘‘choice’’ and ‘‘decision-making’’ mechanisms and yet we would not wish to
imply that they are conscious, attribution of emotions to animals has to be done
with care. Whether or not an animal possesses anticipatory mechanisms associated
with positive and negative reinforcement learning may be a guide as to whether it
has evolved emotions.

The search for animal consciousness is
frequently seen as the search for higher and
higher cognitive abilities in animals. Thus
most theories of consciousness emphasise
intellectual achievement—the ability to
form abstract concepts, for example, to understand and to use language or to be able
to plan ahead and work out what to do in
novel situations. For this reason, the
achievements of animals such as Alex the
parrot (Pepperberg, 1999) and Kanzi the
Bonobo (Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin,
1994) are immensely significant. But although these achievements are impressive,
too much emphasis on the cognitive and intellectual side of consciousness may lead us
to overlook other aspects that are equally
important. It does not take much intellectual
effort to experience pain, fear or hunger. We
can be conscious of a headache or afraid of
flying without being able to put the experience into words or reason about it. We
may in fact tell ourselves that flying is a
relatively safe way of travelling—in other
words, we try to dispel a basic emotion
with cognitive reasoning.
Might it be, then, that our search for animal consciousness could fruitfully be extended to the realm of the emotions and
therefore potentially to a much wider range
1 From the Symposium Animal Consciousness: Historical, Theoretical, and Empirical Perspectives presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Integrative and Comparative Biology, 6–10 January 1999,
at Denver, Colorado.

of animals than just the ones that are outstandingly clever? Might it not be that the
conscious experience of emotions is far older in evolutionary time than the ability to
form concepts and certainly than that to use
language? The purpose of this contribution
is to see what the study of animal emotions
can tell us about consciousness in animals.
My own interest in animal emotions
arose from working for many years on animal welfare, where a central issue is
whether and under what circumstances animals suffer—that is, experience strong or
persistent negative emotions. These are
questions of far more than just theoretical
importance. If animals do experience fear
and pain and if they experience frustration
as a result of being unable to perform their
natural behaviour patterns, then this has legal and ethical importance and in turn may
have major economic consequences.
Indeed, the really important moral issues
in animal welfare arise precisely because of
the belief held by many people that animals
do have conscious emotional experiences.
An early advocate of this idea was Jeremy
Bentham (1789) who wrote the often-quoted lines: ‘‘The question is not, Can they
reason? nor, Can they talk but Can they suffer?’’ And such views are echoed by more
recent philosophers such as Bernard Rollin.
It is thus very important that we have some
way of studying suffering—the unpleasant
emotions of animals.
There are basically two approaches that
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have been adopted to studying animal emotions—the functional and the mechanistic.
The functional approach means examining
the role of emotions in human behaviour
and then asking whether the function is the
same in humans and non-humans. In many
cases it is possible to apply Darwinian ideas
to emotions and ask how emotions (in us
an in other species) contribute to an organism’s fitness. Fear, for example, is adaptive
and functions to increase fitness both
through motivating an animal to remove itself from danger and also to avoid similar
situations in the future.
A widely used framework for viewing
emotions in a functional context is that described by Oatley and Jenkins (1998) who
see emotions as having three stages: (i) appraisal in which there is a conscious or unconscious evaluation of an event as relevant
to a particular goal. An emotion is positive
when that goal is advanced and negative
when it is impeded (ii) action readiness
where the emotion gives priority to one or
a few kinds of action and may give urgency
to one so that it can interrupt or compete
with others and (iii) physiological changes,
facial expression and then behavioural action. The trouble with this formulation is
that it is so general and unspecific that it
encompasses almost all behaviour in the
sense that almost everything that humans or
other animals do would have to involve
such stages. Building a robot to behave in
an autonomous and useful way, would almost certainly involve ensuring that it could
evaluate its environment as either beneficial
or harmful, give priority to one action that
would be beneficial and then carry out the
action. Worse, it even seems to apply to
plants operating without nervous systems
and using the simplest of mechanisms. For
example, the parasitic plant, Dodder (Cuscata europaea) appears to ‘‘choose’’ which
host plants to parasitize on the basis of an
initial evaluation of a potential host’s nutritional status. Kelly (1992) tied pieces of
Dodder stem onto Hawthorn bushes which
had been either fed extra nutrients or
starved of nutrients. The transplanted growing shoots were more likely to coil on (‘‘accept’’) host plants of high nutritional status
and grow away from (‘‘reject’’) hosts of

poor quality and this acceptance or rejection occurred before any food had been taken from the host. It was thus based on an
as yet unknown evaluation by the parasite
of the host’s potential food value and, within three hours, the growing tips could be
seen either growing at right angles away
from a rejected stem or coiling around one
it would eventually feed from. By changing
the time scale (hours rather than minutes)
and the mechanism (growth rather than behaviour), we have an organism that shows
appraisal, action readiness and action—the
supposed functions of emotion without
needing a nervous system at all. This suggests that merely defining emotions in a
rather vague functional way of what they
do in us and then asking whether there is
evidence of similar functions in non-human
animals is not going to be very fruitful. We
need to look in more detail at how the functions are carried out.
The second possible approach to the
study of animal emotions is therefore to
look at the mechanisms underlying emotions and to see whether they are similar in
ourselves and other species. Can we look at
what changes both physiologically and behaviourally when we feel happy, sad, etc.
and see whether similar changes take in
place in non-human animals?
In humans, there are three systems underlying emotions (e.g., Oatley and Jenkins,
1998). These are (i) the cognitive/verbal.
People can report on what they are feeling
and indeed this is one of the main ways we
have of knowing what other people are feeling. (ii) autonomic. These include changes
in heart rate, temperature and hormone levels when we experience emotions (iii) behaviour/expressive. Different emotions give
rise to different behaviour and different facial expressions.
Although of course we cannot use (i) for
non-human species since they cannot tell us
what they are feeling, it might be possible
to use similarities in (ii) and (iii) to tell us
what emotions they might be having. Unfortunately, there are problems since the
three emotional systems do not necessarily
correlate with each other, even in humans.
Sometimes, for example, strong subjective
emotions occur with no obvious autonomic
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changes, as when someone experiences a
rapid switch from excitement to fear on a
roller coaster. This does not mean that the
change in emotional experience has no
physiological basis. It just means that it is
probably due to a subtle change in brain
state rather than the obvious autonomic
changes that most physiological methods
pick up. At other times, the emotion we experience and report corresponds to several
different kinds of autonomic change or one
kind of autonomic change such as heart rate
can be shown to accompany very different
emotions (Wagner, 1989; Frijda, 1986; Cacioppo et al., 1993).
This lack of correlation is not in fact,
very surprising. Many of the physiological
changes that occur in our bodies when we
feel different emotions are related to the actions we are likely to take, such as running.
As running occurs when we are afraid and
are running away or excited and running
towards (chasing) something we want, the
same physiological preparations are appropriate for both situations and consequently
a range of emotions.
Another reason why the different emotional systems may diverge is that we have
‘multiple routes to action’ in other words,
the same actions can be prompted by instructions from different parts of the brain
(Rolls, 1999). An obvious example is
breathing. Most of the time we are not conscious of taking breath—it is done automatically. But if we are drowning or told to
take deep breaths by a doctor, control shifts
to a conscious route. The existence of multiple routes to action makes the comparison
with other species particularly difficult,
since non-humans could show similar behaviour to ourselves but have it controlled
by a pathway that, in ourselves, is just one
of the possible routes we can use. The fact
that we can, when the occasion demands,
become conscious of what we are doing
does not, therefore, necessarily mean that
other species have all the same circuits that
we do. We may have evolved an additional
conscious verbal route that is lacking in
them. Indeed the evolution of the vertebrate
brain has often involved overlaying existing
pathways with new ones rather than eliminating existing ones (Panksepp, 1998).
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But if neither similarities of function nor
similarities of mechanism between humans
and non-humans can be reliably used to tell
us about emotions in other species, what
can we do? What is needed is a combination of a functional and mechanistic approaches that is considerably more specific
than the very general approaches I have
outlined so far. Only by understanding the
very specific mechanisms associated with
emotions in ourselves can we hope to be
able to know what to look for in other species. As we have already seen, by being too
general (emotions are associated with appraisal and action readiness), we include
plants and organisms and machines that operate on the very simplest of mechanisms.
And by expecting emotions to be reflected
in obvious autonomic measures (such as
hormonal state and heart rate), we are unable to distinguish the subtleties of emotions even in ourselves.
Let us start with a more specific evolutionary argument. Animals are able to respond to challenges to their health and wellbeing in various ways and the mechanisms
they use can be divided into those that repair damage to the organism’s fitness when
damage has already occurred and those that
enable the organism to anticipate probable
damage and take avoiding action so that the
damage does not occur at all. The ability to
fight off infection with the immune system
and to heal wounds are examples of repair
mechanisms, whereas most behaviour
(drinking before dehydration occurs, hiding
before a predator appears) falls into the category of anticipation and pre-emptive action. In fact, we can see the evolution of
cognitive abilities in animals as the evolution of more and more sophisticated anticipatory mechanisms, reaching further and
further back in time away from the danger
itself, until in ourselves we may take out a
health insurance policy many years before
any damage is done.
The important point about these anticipatory mechanisms, however, is that many
of them can be highly effective without the
organism being in any way conscious.
Where an aspect of the environment is
highly predictable (such as the sun rising
every day), very accurate anticipation can
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be achieved by endogenous rhythms or by
simple kineses and taxes. The ability of
Dodder plants to anticipate which hosts are
likely to yield the most food before investing in the coiling and growth needed to extract any nutrients is a very good example
of a simple anticipatory mechanism and
should serve as an object lesson about the
dangers of using words like ‘choice’ or ‘appraisal’ to imply similarity to the mechanisms we ourselves use. Just to emphasise
this point, we should be equally cautious
about the conclusions we draw from choice
tests in animals, such as those that show
that chickens prefer one kind of flooring to
another (Hughes and Black, 1973) or will
‘‘work’’ (squeeze through gaps or push
heavy weights) to get at something they
like. Even plants will push up through concrete to get at light and air so both simple
choice tests and those involving physical
obstacles to allow animals to get what they
‘want’ could be nothing more than the operation of animals being evolved by natural
selection to respond to certain sorts of stimuli and to keep on responding even when
there are obstacles. Despite some of the
claims that have been made (e.g., Dawkins,
1990), persistence in the face of physical
difficulties does not imply that animals experience the same emotions that we have
when we have to work harder to get what
we want.
But some animals, including ourselves,
have evolved anticipatory mechanisms that
are quite different in kind from anything we
find in plants, anticipatory mechanisms that
cannot be explained by simple tropisms and
taxes, anticipatory mechanisms that may
necessitate emotions. The key is reinforcement learning or the ability to change behaviour as a result of experience so that behaviour is controlled by completely arbitrary stimuli, quite unlike anything that natural selection could have built into the
organism. I am not speaking here of just
any change that may occur as a result of
experience. The immune system changes as
a result of experience with certain pathogens but this can be done through a preprogrammed (if highly sophisticated) response. There is no need to invoke ‘‘emotions’’ in the way our immune systems

change as a result of their experiences of
different diseases. Similarly, if an organism
(plant or animal) habituates or changes its
response as a result of repeated experience,
there is no reason to suppose that they have
emotions because receptors can be linked
(hard-wired) to response mechanisms in
predictable ways.
But where an animal learns to perform
an arbitrary response to approach or avoid
a stimulus, natural selection cannot hardwire connections between receptor and response mechanisms or evolve simple rules
for how responses should change as a result
of experience (Rolls, 1999). For example,
suppose a rat learns that turning in a righthand circle gives it food and turning in a
left-hand circle gives it an electric shock
and then, when the experimenter changes
the rules of the experiment, learns to go left
to get food and right to avoid a shock. Natural selection could not have led to the evolution of rats able to do this by any simple
rules. Hard-wiring or innate response biases
could not account for the completely arbitrary response (turning or anything else the
irritating human chose to devise) nor for the
ability of the animal to change and do
something different.
The only way the rat could achieve such
a feat would be by having a reward-punishment system which allowed it to associate
any action it happened to make it ‘‘feel better’’ or ‘‘feel worse’’ and either repeat or
avoid such actions in future (Rolls, 1999).
Specific rules (such as always turn right or
always turn towards red stimuli) would be
very much less effective than more general
rules (repeat what leads to feeling better or
pleasure). General emotional states of pleasure and suffering would enable animals to
exploit many more behavioural strategies to
increase their fitness than specific stimulusresponse links. The point is, however, that
without emotions to guide it, an animal
would have no way of knowing whether a
behaviour never performed before by any
of its ancestors should be repeated or not.
By monitoring the consequences of its behaviour by whether it leads to ‘‘pleasure’’
or ‘‘suffering’’ it can build up a complex
string of quite arbitrary responses. It can
learn, for example, that pressing a lever
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leads to the appearance of a striped box
which contains food. By finding the striped
box ‘‘pleasurable’’ because it is associated
with food and learning to press the lever to
obtain this pleasure, the rat learns to obtain
food through a route that is not open to an
animal totally pre-programmed in its responses. Emotions are therefore necessary
to reinforcement learning.
We have thus come full circle. If it is
only animals that are clever enough to master certain cognitive tasks (those associated
with reinforcement learning) that have emotions, then the apparent distinction between
cognition and emotions is illusory. Only
certain kinds of task require emotions. Others, including those achieved by plants do
not. At least this gives us a way of excluding plants from our discussion of consciousness and gives us a way of discriminating those organisms that are likely to
have emotion from those that probably do
not. We can at least do experiments to find
out whether a given animal (an insect, say)
does or does not have the capacity for arbitrary reinforcement learning.
But does this really solve the problem of
the connection between emotion and consciousness? Of course it does not and I have
to admit that I have so far blurred a distinction that is of great importance. I am
guilty of using the word ‘‘emotion’’ in two
quite different senses that must now be
clearly distinguished (Dawkins, 1998). The
first sense in which we might use the word
‘‘emotion’’ is to refer to strictly observable
physiological and behavioural changes that
occur under particular circumstances such
as the appearance of a predator. But we
might also use it in a second sense to refer
to the subjective conscious experience
(fear) that we know we experience under
conditions of danger.
The problem with the word ‘‘emotion’’
is that it tempts us to slip from one meaning
to the other, often without realising that we
have done so. We start out describing what
we can observe—the behaviour and physiology of the animals or people. I have indeed given an account of why emotional
states may have evolved, with behavioural
criteria for deciding whether they might exist in a given species. I carefully put scare
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quotes around words such as ‘‘pleasure’’
and ‘‘suffering’’ in describing positive and
negative emotional states. But the problem
is that issue of whether conscious experiences as we know them accompany these
states in other species is a totally separate
question. Given the ambiguous nature of
the word ‘‘emotion’’, it may not be obvious
that it is a separate question because it so
easy to believe that once we have postulated a scale of positive to negative reinforcers, once, that is, we have a common currency in which different stimuli can be
evaluated to how positive or negative they
are on this emotional scale, then we have
also into the conscious experience of pan
and pleasure that we all know about from
our human perspective. But this would be
an error. It is quite possible (logically) for
animals to have positive or negative emotional states without it feeling like anything.
Stimuli could be evaluated as negative, in
other words, but they wouldn’t necessarily
hurt.
Strictly speaking, therefore, consciousness still eludes us. It is my personal view
that emotional states defined in the way I
have described (using reinforcement value)
does imply subjective experience—a conscious awareness of pleasure and pain that
is not so very different from our own. But
that should be taken for what it is: a personal statement of where I happen to stand,
not a view that can be grounded in empirical fact. It is just as valid (and just as open
to challenge) as the more widely held beliefs that consciousness ‘‘kicks in’’ with the
ability to form abstract concept or plan
ahead or use a language (Rosenthal, 1993;
Dennett, 1996).
If, however, consciousness is associated
with reinforcement learning and the first
conscious experiences that occurred on this
planet were the basic ones of pain and pleasure, long before any concepts were thought
of or any plans laid for the future, then this
does have implications for the way we see
other species. It implies that emotional
awareness is evolutionarily very old and
possibly very widespread in the animal
kingdom. As Damasio (1999) and Rolls
(1999) have others have recently empha-
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sized, emotion deserves much more attention than it has had so far.
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